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BIANNUAL SURVEY

not whether he gives a name to the cause of action at all or even
that he gives it a wrong name." '24
Today the explicit grant of power contained in the last sentence of section 3017(a) permits the court to grant relief that is
"appropriate to the proof."
It is therefore clear that a court
possesses the power to award legal or equitable relief whenever it
is "within its jurisdiction" to do so.' 25 This section has the effect
of eliminating the law-equity distinction espoused in Jackson and
followed in many subsequent decisions. 26 This is one of the
important changes wrought by the CPLR.
There is no danger of the right to trial by jury being lost
here, if such right exists. To the extent that the right to legal
relief appears at a later juncture of the action-it having been
assumed up to then that only equitable relief was being sought so
that trial by jury was neither demanded nor demandable-the court
must at that time afford to the party against whom the legal relief
' 27
is sought "an opportunity to demand a jury trial of such issues.'
Effectiveness of bill of particulars limited by permitting proof of
allegations not included therein.
In the case of Pogor v. Cue Taxi Serv., Inc.,' 28 the only
allegation of negligence appearing in the bill of particulars was
that the defendant's cab driver went through a stop sign. When
it later became clear that the stop sign in issue did not in fact exist,
plaintiff gave evidence of other acts of purported negligence. Objections to the testimony were overruled on the basis that the
additional allegations were, in fact, implied amendments to the
pleadings that served to conform the pleadings to the proof.
"The object of a bill of particulars is to amplify a pleading, to
limit proof and to prevent surprise. . . ." 19 As a result of the
purpose of avoiding surprise at trial, the bill of particulars, of
necessity, adds rigidity to the amendment of pleadings. "Restriction of a party to the legal theory . . .stated in a bill of particulars
seems antithetical to the elimination of the theory-of-the-pleadings
doctrine, which was one of the purposes of CPLR 3013."180 Perhaps it was for that reason that the bill of particulars was eliminated from federal practice in 1948.
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It is clear that the policy allowing liberal amendment of
pleadings is inconsistent with a strict interpretation of the function
of a bill of particulars. When the two come into conflict, a court
will have to choose that which affords the better tool for implementation of the substantive rights involved.
If the edict of CPLR 104 is to be given effect, i.e., that the
CPLR is "liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every civil judicial proceeding," the instant
case is palatable indeed. If it be said that the case diminishes the
utility of the bill of particulars, let it be noted that it was the plan
of the CPLR's draftsmen to do away with that device altogether.1 3'
The court at bar felt that permitting the bill of particulars so to
limit the proof that nothing in the occurrence other than the passing
of a stop sign could be litigated was too technical a reading. If the
proof could be in any way expanded without substantial prejudice
to the other party, as the court might in the context of the case
determine, it would appear that the expansion, though a technical
deviation from the underlying theory of the bill of particulars, was
nonetheless a specific execution of the CPLR's yet broader underlying theory as enunciated in CPLR 104.
ARTICLE 31
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DISCLOSURE

Discovery of names and addresses of witnesses and statements of
witnesses in the possession of an adverse party.
In Rios v. Donovan,132 a personal injury action, two problems
concerning the scope of disclosure were before the court. One
concerned the question of whether the names and addresses of
witnesses to an accident known by the adverse party may be the
subject of pre-trial discovery. The other involved the question of
the discovery of statements made by witnesses which are in the
possession of an adverse party. Each problem shall be dealt with
separately herein.
Problem I:-Disclosure of names and addresses of witnesses.
Plaintiff sought to discover, pursuant to CPLR 3120, the
names and addresses of all persons who witnessed the accident
and all persons having knowledge of facts concerning the accident
who had given statements to defendant or his attorney. The defendant moved for a protective order under CPLR 3013. The
court held that proper procedure required plaintiff to ascertain the
names of witnesses through his examination of the defendant or
other persons during the taking of oral depositions concerning the
57 (1964).
App. Div. 2d 409, 250 N.Y.S.2d 818 (1st Dep't 1964).
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